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30 Years of Experience and a Way Forward

Norbert Molitor, Managing Director PLEJADES GmbH - Independent Expert Feldstr. 5, D 64347 Griesheim, Germany www.pleja.de



Before the Accident

- Ensuring nuclear safety was always a fundamental principle and challenge in the peaceful use of nuclear power.
- Engineers, scientists and operators always worked hard for it.
- More than 30 years ago it was difficult to imagine an accident comprising:
 - Loss of control over nuclear core,
 - Complete explosive destruction of all physical barriers provided by reactor and reactor building,
 - Spreading reactor core materials in the environment,
 - Subsequent fire within the reactor / reactor premises remains,
 - Widespread radioactive contamination over thousands of kilometer.
- The unimagined became bitter reality on 26 April 1986 with the severe accident at Unit 4 of ChNPP.



After the Accident – First Steps

- -> Huge efforts for protection of public, workers and environment:
- Immediate measures :
 - Fire fighting
 - Shut down of NPP
 - Evacuation of pubic from the immediate vicinity
 - Explore and analysis of the situation



- Liquidation measures:
 - Establishing of an Exclusion Zone
 - Construction of physical barriers around ChNPP Unit 4: Object Ukritiye
 - Clean-up and recovery of the site to re-operate ChNPP Unit 1-3
 - Creation of immediate accident waste management facilities
 - Burrying of high active contamination to reduce radition levels



International Cooperation Basis since 1995

- "Memorandum of Understanding" between Ukraine, G7 and European Union was signed in 1995
- It addressed nuclear safety cooperation and include among others:
 - The development and support of an environmentally sound and cost effective program for ChNPP Unit 4.
 - Shut down and decommissioning of ChNPP Unit 1-3
- Based on the Memorandum a "Recommended course of actions" has been developed in 1996 for Unit 4.
- Based on this "Recommended course of actions" the "Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP)" has been developed which was decided at the "Denver Summit in 1997".
- These studies were carried out in compliance with the " National Program for Conversion of Object Ukritiye into safe ecological conditions".



Development of the recommended course of actions

Ukritiye Risks Long Term Short Term Priorities identified Decision (1) Decision (2) not possible Removal of Fund top priorities Inventory yes Decision (3) Short Term Measures Time Long Term Measures Convert Intermediate Long Term Ukritiye to Confinement Confinement **Disposal Site** Remove Remove Dispose Store PI F JADE Dispose

Recommendation of ChNPP and International Expert Team:

- Phase 1 Stabilisation and other Short Term Measures
- Phase 2 Preparation for conversion into an environmentally safe site
- Phase 3 Conversion into an environmentally safe site

Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP)

Object Ukritiye

Various hazards & risks Stabilized Ukritiye Monitoring & Safety improvement New Safe Confinement Deconstruction unstable parts Inventory Management & Removal Strategy

Less Reasonably hazards & achievable risk risk situation SIP: Program with 22 Tasks to improve safety Inventory Removal

Time

No nuclear and radiological risks remaining





Possible Steps after SIP completion

Phases of recommended course of actions (not included in SIP):

- **Phase 2.3**: Safe control of the inventory according FCM strategy developed
 - Option: Retrieve accessible FCM and transfer it into safer conditions (e.g. on site storage)
 - Preparation of next conversion phase



- **Phase 3.1**: Convert remaining reactor structures with its remaining inventory to a system with relaxed requirements
- **Phase 3.2**: Long term control and maintain the safe structure until the remaining inventory can be removed
- Phase 3.3: Inventory removal



A Look and a Way Forward

The main future challenge at ChNPP Unit 4 will be:

- The safe management of the inventory inside the Unit 4 until its removal and transfer into a safe geological disposal.
- Focus should be given to the developed inventory management strategy, addressing:
 - Retrieval technologies
 - Processing of retrieved inventory
 - Access corridors for control and removal
 - Partial removal of accessible and retrievable FCM
 - Conversion of current structures optimized for long term safe management of remaining inventory
 - Control of remaining inventory until its removal
- The SIP and the other work performed at ChNPP provides good boundaries to perform these activities!



Conclusions

Let us conclude:

- 30 years ago an **unimagined accident** happened.
- Within 30 years **extraordinary works** have been performed.
- Within 30 years **safety has been improved** step by step.
- With the soon completion of **New Safe Confinement** the baseline is set for:

Safe management of nuclear & radioactive inventory within the framework to achieve a sustainable and environmentally safe end state



Thanks

With the achievements made and challenges remaining let me take the opportunity to **thank**:

- all people having vested so much efforts and time in their lives in the past,
- those **people** who will continue this work **in the future**,
- Ukraine for its extraordinary efforts to improve the situation in their country which is also a safety improvement for neighbouring countries.
- the **international community** for their **support** in the past as well as in the future.
- the organisations who have contributed to realize an effective response to recover from an unimagined accident.
- you for your attention for nuclear accidents, which is your important contribution for those who are working hard to recover.

